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ABSTRACT
The tragic events in Liberia (1990), Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) evoked a
rethinking on the pivotal role assigned to the United Nations and the international
community in African conflict resolution.  Subsequently, there emerged clarion calls
for African solutions to African conflicts, with foreign intervention only playing a
complementary role.  This unfolding of events put a democratic South Africa, a
former pariah state, in a good stead to take this initiative in sub-Saharan Africa.
So far, South Africa s circumspect role has elicited mixed reactions from concerned
parties within and outside her territorial boundaries.  In this paper, the nature of
South Africa s involvement in subsequent conflicts is discussed.  The main objec-
tive is to highlight factors which have moulded South Africa s intervention, and
their impact on her perceptions about prospects for future African initiatives in the
twenty-first century.
Earlier on, in 1992, the United Nations (UN) decided to review its strategy for
conflict resolution and peacekeeping.  Non-payment of contributions coupled with
the reluctance of Western countries to commit their military personnel in hazardous
peacekeeping operations (in Africa) also made it imperative for the UN to review its
strategy (Boutros-Ghali 1992:28,41).  Boutros-Ghali s Agenda for Peace, the policy
document on UN peacekeeping, came as a direct response to these challenges.  This
document, inter alia, called for the partial delegation of peace-keeping duties to
regional organisations (Boutros-Ghali 1992:chap 7).  However, the events in
Somalia and Rwanda showed that many of the recommendations of the UN s
Agenda for Peace are, in fact, implausible.
In the light of these developments, a democratic South Africa as a dominant member
state within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) seemed to be in
good stead to be in the forefront of renewed moves towards bringing African solu-
tions to African conflicts (Jan 1997:13; McGowan & Ahwireng-Obeng 1998:1-3).
However, this proved not to be an easy task at all, for South Africa carried with her a
considerable baggage of the past (See, amongst others, Landsberg 1996:1670-1671;
Gwexe 1996:29-32).
To mark a clean break with the past, South Africa, among other things, has had to
transform herself from a pariah state into a first among the equals in Southern
Africa.  In the process, South Africa adopted a remarkably ambivalent foreign
policy towards the region and indeed the rest of the continent.2
This paper will start off with a brief review of recent attempts — both foreign and
African — in conflict resolution in this continent, to be followed with an overview of
South Africa s endeavours.  It will be argued that South Africa s conception of
African conflict resolution falls short of meeting the heightened expectations in 
the continent as a whole; that South Africa s position is influenced by the magni-
tude of daunting domestic challenges which will, for some foreseeable future,
continue to drain much of her meagre resources; and that in pursuit of legitimate 
interests abroad, South Africa will nevertheless be impelled to fulfil her continental
obligations.
This paper will then conclude that without substantial financial backing from the
West, particularly the US, South Africa will remain pessimistic over the prospects
for African conflict resolution in the next millennium.
105
1. INTRODUCTION
The peaceful end of the Cold War changed the world in different and profound ways
(See, for example Boutros-Ghali 1992:5-7).  Bipolarity, for example, gave way to
unipolarity.  However, this post-Cold War scenario is likely to be ephemeral as the
political clout of the United States (US) continues to be challenged.  This is
precisely because the circumstances in which the military strength of the US
remains effective continue to diminish gradually.  US hegemony continues to be
challenged as powers like Germany, Japan, and China gradually ascend in economic
power relative to that of the US (Kegley & Wittkopf 1995:104-106).
In addition, the end of the Cold war adversely affected third world countries as they
became more marginalised by the West (Bush & Szeftel 1995:291-293; Williams
1997:134; Neethling 1998:27).  In the light of the changes brought by the end of the
Cold War, economic considerations superseded political considerations.  This then
changed the focus of the West to the developing countries in Latin America and
South East Asia.  The first world countries were also pre-occupied with enticing
former communist countries in Eastern Europe and with containing potential
conflicts in the former Soviet Union.
In his gloomy assessment of Africa s position, Deng had this to say:
Africans are increasingly being told that, given the resources in the world,
shrinking as they are, and the tendency of withdrawal and isolationism on
the part of the wealthier industrialised countries of the West, they will have
to rely on themselves primarily and whatever help they can expect from the
outside will be minimal, targeted at specific situations.  This limited help
will naturally be motivated by the values of those who are coming to assist.
Accordingly, the degree to which a country lives up to the values of human
rights, humanitarianism, democracy and the market economy will deter-
mine the degree to which it will receive support from outside.
(Deng 1996: 23)
In the light of these changes, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the
Declaration of Fundamental Changes, which moves from the premise that Africa
has to assume responsibility for its own affairs.  As a follow up to this, in Cairo in
1993, the OAU adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution (MCPMR) (Jan 1997:13).
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That invasion was a direct expression of the people s disillusionment with the
despotic regime of Samuel Doe, which ascended into power under dubious circum-
stances in 1980.  Since then, the paranoia of Doe s regime manifested itself in waves
of acts of brutality which this regime was prone to unleash against its imagined or
real enemies, particularly civilians from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups.  Amongst
the most gruesome acts was the 1985 Monrovia beach massacre of the masterminds
of the abortive coup in 1985, led by Thomas Quiwonkpa (Sesay 1996:36).
In his analysis of the causes of this civil war, Sesay (1996:36-37) did not hesitate to
factor in tribalism, introduced by Doe s regime.  For example, its bureaucracy, army,
security forces and the public services were teeming with members of his ethnic
group, the Krahn.  It is not surprising that Quiwonkpa, the mastermind of the failed
coup in 1985, was from a rival ethnic group, the Gio, from the Nimba county.  Other
ethnic groups were the Mandigos and the Mano.  All these groups were later united
in their cause to avenge years of maltreatment by Doe s regime.5
Given the number of failed coup attempts by the NPFL in the 1980s and the ruthless
manner in which Doe s regime dealt with its opposition, the 1989 invasion was
taken flippantly for a start.  However, it was this attack which ignited the bloodiest
civil war ever in Liberia.
In the light of this carnage, the failure of the international community to intervene in
Liberia came as a great surprise.  Sesay corroborated this view:
The failure of the US to intervene came as a disappointment to many, but left
some in the hope that the rest of the international community would do some-
thing to stop the carnage.  In particular, people pinned hopes on the United
Nations which, in the aftermath of the end of the cold war superpower rivalry,
appeared to have reinvented itself and seemed competent to handle issues that
threatened international peace and security.  However, almost three years
after the fighting and despite calls from some quarters for a direct interven-
tion, the UN was conspicuously absent from the Liberian scene.
(Sesay, 1996:40-41)
As alluded to in the foregoing quotation, a bombshell was dropped by the US when
she stressed that the civil war in Liberia was purely an internal affair and did not
warrant a direct US invasion.  This was unexpected, given the strategic importance
of Liberia, and the special relationships between the two during the 1980s (Sesay,
1996:40; Williams, 1997:136).
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2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA IN THE 1990S: 
NEW PATTERNS, RISING DANGERS?
The thaw of the Cold War in 1989 and the emergence of the conflicts in Liberia,
Somalia and Rwanda evoked calls for a re-assessment of the orthodox view that a
resolution of African conflicts relies on excessive international intervention.3 Such
intervention was said to come from the UN, the US and the former colonial powers.
However, profound global changes engendered by the end of the Cold War brought
crisis in this view to the fore.
Since the end of the Cold War, three separate events in Africa stood out to expose the
major flaws of this view.  The first was failure of the international community in
1990 to intervene in resolving the civil war in Liberia.  When it became abundantly
clear to West African states that the anticipated foreign intervention was not forth-
coming, drastic steps were taken to initiate regional moves to resolve the conflict.
Given the urgency of the situation, it goes without saying that such hastily arranged
moves were fraught with problems.
Another event was the breakout of an ethnic conflict, plunging Somalia into a
bloody civil war in 1992.  Following a scathing criticism for callousness while
Samuel Doe s egregious regime embarked on a systematic slaughter of civilians in
Liberia, the international community under the auspices of the UN and the US
wasted no time in intervening in Somalia.  This time around, their intervention was
labelled by commentators as excessive.  In the light of this, it is not surprising that
the operation in Somalia was fraught with problems as well.
The third, and the most tragic, event was a notably minimal intervention of the inter-
national community in a civil war between the ethnic Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda
earlier on in 1994.  As will be shown hereunder, each of the subsequent peace-
keeping missions had its own fair share of problems.
The Liberian debacle
Events that led to the recent conflict in Liberia are well documented elsewhere4 and
will, in fact, not be repeated here.  However, for the purposes of this paper, a
synopsis of the main events will be made hereunder.
The civil war in Liberia started on the 24th of December, 1989, when Charles
Taylor s group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded Liberia.
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Generally, the limited success of ECOMOG was evidenced by the fact that in 1994,
150 000 people were slain and 750 000 more were refugees in neighbouring states
and over a million were displaced internally (Sesay, 1996:44).  Another shred of
evidence is the fact that out of thirteen brokered cease-fires, none of them was
adhered to for a considerable period of time.
This bleak assessment can be attributed to a regional and international dimension of
the Liberian conflict.  Notable here was the external financial and military support
rendered to the warring factions.  For example, according to Sesay, there is an over-
whelming evidence to the fact that countries like C te d Ivoire, Libya, and Burkina
Faso rendered the required support to Charles Taylor.  During the first year or so of
the conflict, C te d Ivoire went to the extent of blocking any discussion of the
Liberian crisis by the UN  Security Council.  This was done so to give Taylor ample
time to ascend into power and ensure a stable neighbour.  Taylor s realisation of this
state of affairs petrified him; he remained intransigent and strongly objected to
ECOMOG intervention.  Taylor s uncompromising stance can be linked to a percep-
tion within NPFL circles that by calling for a peaceful settlement, ECOMOG
intended to turn NPFL away from the imminent victory.  This factor inhibited the
success of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia.  This assertion affirms Masson and
Fett s analysis (1996:549) of the probability of victory, which posits that:
Any factor that gives either G or R a substantially greater probability of
victory than its rival decreases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement
because the dominant party will be less interested in a settlement if victory
appears inevitable.7
The operation in Liberia brought to the fore new patterns and rising dangers of
peacekeeping in the 1990s: up to September 1992, 61 ECOMOG soldiers, made up
of 36 Nigerians, 9 Ghanaians, 12 Guineans, 2 Sierra Leoneans and 2 Gambians, had
been killed in action.  Thirty seven others — 22 Nigerians, 1 Ghanaian, 12 Guineans
and 2 Sierra Leoneans — were killed just before September 1992.  In addition, two
Guineans and one Sierra Leonean were also missing in action during this period.8
Case study: Somalia
The reluctance of the UN to intervene in Liberia, coupled with its alacrity to intervene
in the Gulf, raised questions about the impartiality of the UN.  Africa s feeling of
having been marooned was further accentuated when the UN decided to get
involved in Yugoslavia in 1992.  So when an internecine warfare plunged Somalia
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In the light of this gross irresponsibility, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) decided to form a monitoring group — ECOMOG.  Maj Gen Ishola
Williams gave us a broad picture of how the prevalent atmosphere of desperation led
to the formation of ECOMOG:
The situation required an urgent response, but the Liberian issue was
ignored.  The UN was engrossed in addressing the Gulf war.  The United
States had other priorities.  West Africa was pushed to take the initiative.
Immediately questions were asked whether ECOWAS was justified in
creating ECOMOG, the ECOWAS monitoring and observation group, and
in intervening in Liberia.
(Williams 1996:80) 
ECOMOG was a brain-child of Nigeria.  Other participating countries were
Anglophone countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea.  When
ECOMOG was set up in August 1990, it was hoped that its mission in Liberia would
last for twelve months.  Within that period ECOMOG intended to have opened
routes for much needed humanitarian aid; to have established a buffer zone around
the capital Monrovia to enable the discussion of a cease-fire; and to have taken over
security duties while an interim government was being established to facilitate
national reconciliation and oversee a democratic return to normal life (Williams
1996:80).  To this end, a first contingent of 3 500 thousand troops from the five
ECOWAS countries was deployed in Liberia on the 22nd of August 1990.6
ECOMOG s case was unique in the sense that it represented the only example in the
world of a regionally-based peacekeeping force sent on a peacekeeping mission
within the same region.  However, this turned out to be its Achilles heel.  For one
thing, from its inception ECOMOG had to grapple with a legitimacy problem.  This
legitimacy crisis was precipitated by the fact that Charles Taylor, who controlled
90% of the country, objected to ECOMOG s intervention.  Taylor stuck to his word
as he attacked the peace keepers.  This then compelled ECOMOG to change its
modus operandi from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement.  This situation was ex-
acerbated when Samuel Doe, on his way to ECOMOG headquarters, was captured,
tortured, and killed by Prince Johnson — a leader of the Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) faction that defected from the NPFL in May
1990.  ECOMOG s failure to prevent this incident of the 10th of September, 1990,
led to the collapse of a temporary cease-fire brokered by ECOWAS.  In the 
aftermath of this, Taylor then threatened to seize the capital Monrovia at all costs.
ECOMOG was then compelled to use force to stop him (Barrett 1993:638-640).
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the worst humanitarian crises ever handled by the UNHCR (UN High
Commissioner for Refugees).
UNAMIR proved to be a dismal failure: it could not prevent the genocide stated
above, or ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid to the refugee camps like
Goma in Eastern Zaire, nor did it solicit the support of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
which, after assuming power, equally criticised UNAMIR for failing to prevent the
genocide.  When UNAMIR was withdrawn in March 1996, the vast majority of
Rwandan refugees were still displaced.
A blame for the tragic situation can be squarely put at the door of the UN which,
because of the Somali fatigue, was not prepared to intervene.  Tom Woodhouse
(1996:129-130) felicitously put this when he said:
While in Somalia the UN came under criticism for intervening too much
militarily, in Rwanda it came under attack for not intervening enough.  In
April 1994, following the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers serving with
UNAMIR, the force was reduced to a small staff of just 270 when the geno-
cide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was taking place.
UNAMIR indicated that the UN did not do a proper analysis of the situation on the
ground.  After failing to prevent the genocide in April 1994 in which up to a million
people were shot, hacked or burned to death, it equally failed to deal with the
humanitarian crisis that ensued.  Conditions in the refugee camps in Kigali and
Goma deteriorated because, amongst other things, there was no clear co-operation
between the UN agencies and the NGOs.13
As alluded to earlier on, the three operations brought to the fore the changing
patterns of conflict resolution endeavours in Africa.  For one, during this period,
more than ever, the intervening parties were forced to rely on direct military inter-
vention, since diplomacy and economic sanctions, as it were, became more and
more inappropriate for these deep-rooted conflicts.
Also, these emerging patterns subjected the pacifiers to a great strain.  This was due
to a simple reason that unlike diplomacy, direct military intervention required the
intervening parties to commit a considerable share of their meagre resources to the
peacekeeping operations.  As a result, to mitigate the effects of the high costs that
are invariably incurred in operations of this nature, the intervening parties, as was
shown in Liberia and Somalia, have been tempted to change their modus operandi
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into a stateless condition in 1992,9 the impartiality of the UN was subjected to an
acid test.  This time around there was no way out for the UN: it could not risk being
accused of upholding double standards.  For this specific reason, the UN then
decided to intervene in Somalia.10 Kapundu (1996:58) gives us the graphic details 
of the circumstances which led to the ultimate UN intervention in Somalia
(UNOSOM:UN Organisation in Somalia).  He said:
The United Nations did not go into Somalia because it wanted to.  There
was a great deal of hesitation.  The Security Council had taken a decision to
go into Yugoslavia.  The Security Council had refused, or had been blocked,
from taking any decision on Liberia and the OAU and its own subsidiary
organisations had to go into Liberia alone, with limited resources and so
people began to ask why was the United Nations prepared to go into
Yugoslavia and not Somalia.  The international media also portrayed
horrific incidents coming from Somalia and so the United Nations decided
to see whether it could do something in Somalia.
So when UN/US intervention in Somalia commenced December 1992, it had lofty
ideas of saving millions of Somalis from starvation and restoring peace and stability.
However, this operation enjoyed only a limited success as it was punctuated by the
killings of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers on the 6th of June, 1996, and eigh-
teen US Army Rangers in October 1993.  In the aftermath of these killings the US
unilaterally decided to withdraw its military personnel from Somalia with effect
from March 1995.  The three year operation in Somalia also highlighted the rising
dangers of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1995, 130
peacekeepers died and this was the highest fatality rate in the history of UN peace-
keeping (Woodhouse 1996:129).  UNOSOM II never achieved its objectives11 and
had to be ignominiously called off in 1995.
Case study: Rwanda
To the UN, the foregoing UN operation was salutary in the narrow sense that when
the civil war broke out in Rwanda, UN intervention was reduced to a bare minimum.
At its peak, the UN force serving with UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for
Rwanda) stood at 5 500.12 This small number incapacitated the UN as UNAMIR
could not be in a position to prevent the genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus,
which was at its peak during the first few days of the fighting.  For example,
between the 28th and the 29th of April, 1994, 250 000 refugees flooded into
Tanzania.  Later on, others flooded into the neighbouring Zaire, precipitating one of
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the worst humanitarian crises ever handled by the UNHCR (UN High
Commissioner for Refugees).
UNAMIR proved to be a dismal failure: it could not prevent the genocide stated
above, or ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid to the refugee camps like
Goma in Eastern Zaire, nor did it solicit the support of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
which, after assuming power, equally criticised UNAMIR for failing to prevent the
genocide.  When UNAMIR was withdrawn in March 1996, the vast majority of
Rwandan refugees were still displaced.
A blame for the tragic situation can be squarely put at the door of the UN which,
because of the Somali fatigue, was not prepared to intervene.  Tom Woodhouse
(1996:129-130) felicitously put this when he said:
While in Somalia the UN came under criticism for intervening too much
militarily, in Rwanda it came under attack for not intervening enough.  In
April 1994, following the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers serving with
UNAMIR, the force was reduced to a small staff of just 270 when the geno-
cide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was taking place.
UNAMIR indicated that the UN did not do a proper analysis of the situation on the
ground.  After failing to prevent the genocide in April 1994 in which up to a million
people were shot, hacked or burned to death, it equally failed to deal with the
humanitarian crisis that ensued.  Conditions in the refugee camps in Kigali and
Goma deteriorated because, amongst other things, there was no clear co-operation
between the UN agencies and the NGOs.13
As alluded to earlier on, the three operations brought to the fore the changing
patterns of conflict resolution endeavours in Africa.  For one, during this period,
more than ever, the intervening parties were forced to rely on direct military inter-
vention, since diplomacy and economic sanctions, as it were, became more and
more inappropriate for these deep-rooted conflicts.
Also, these emerging patterns subjected the pacifiers to a great strain.  This was due
to a simple reason that unlike diplomacy, direct military intervention required the
intervening parties to commit a considerable share of their meagre resources to the
peacekeeping operations.  As a result, to mitigate the effects of the high costs that
are invariably incurred in operations of this nature, the intervening parties, as was
shown in Liberia and Somalia, have been tempted to change their modus operandi
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in diffusing potentially explosive situations, as in Nigeria for example; in
dispatching military observers to Burundi; in observing the elections in Congo,
Togo, Gabon, amongst other places; and in ensuring that the African states made
their contributions to the UN s peacekeeping operation at the peak of the genocide
in Rwanda (Jan 1997:14).  In addition, pre-eminent individuals within the OAU,
like its Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, began to preach that an effective
implementation of the MCPMR depended mainly on the co-operation of all member
states.  Particular reference was made to the significant role of countries like South
Africa in the south and Egypt in the north.  The rationale is that their industrial
development, presumably, puts them in a much better position to act as logistic
centres for OAU peacekeeping operations.
Furthermore, scholars like Ali Mazrui argued that a panacea to African conflicts
would be a formation of an African Security Council composed of five pivotal
regional states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zaire) which would,
presumably, have the required capacity for such interventions (Woodhouse 1996:135).
With all this having been said, where does South Africa stand in this regard?
Here it needs to be unequivocally stated that South Africa is a unique country
expected to play a pivotal role in a vastly changing world.  South Africa s unique-
ness, according to Sina Odugbeni (1995:701-703),18 can be attributed to a number of
factors.  One, apartheid in South Africa was regarded as a crime against humanity
and evoked struggles world wide.  For this specific reason, the demise of apartheid
drew world-wide attention.  Two, the peaceful elections in 1994 were regarded as
miraculous by the foreign observers who flocked into the country, anticipating that
the election would be marred by violence and would not be free and fair.  Three,
there was a perception that the struggle against apartheid in South Africa was a Pan-
African one.  For this reason, Africans in the Diaspora could not regard themselves
as free while their brothers were still languishing under the apartheid yoke in South
Africa.  Given the euphoria that trailed in the wake of South Africa s liberation,
there were heightened expectations that South Africa would help Africa overcome
her challenges — hunger, civil strife and democratisation.
Generally, South Africa seemed to be in good stead to rise to the occasion.  South
Africa had a strong economical clout as her GNP equalled 36% of the combined
GNPs of all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In the political sphere, South Africa
acted as a role model as her peaceful transition gave impetus to democratisation in
Southern Africa (Odugbeni 1994:701-703).
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from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.14 This can be attributed to a firm belief
that doing so, as opposed to cajoling the belligerent factions to reconcile with one
another, takes a relatively short period and saves a considerable amount of resources.
Furthermore, new patterns of conflict resolution endeavours in Africa have been
brought about by a tendency on the part of the pacifiers to vacillate between multilat-
eral and unilateral interventions and to treat these as analytically distinct forms of
intervention.  The three case studies brought this fact to the fore.  For example, the
situation in Liberia evoked multilateral (ECOMOG) intervention, and that in Somalia
unilateral (US) intervention.  The situation in Rwanda was rather bizarre, oscillating
between the two.  Initially, there was a significant Belgian intervention.  However,
after the withdrawal of Belgium, UNAMIR was perhaps too weak an operation to
warrant classification as a multilateral operation under the aegis of the UN.
In a nutshell, the changing patterns of conflict resolution endeavours in Africa have
actually made it imperative for us to factor-in a wide range of factors in our analysis
of the prospects for African conflict resolution in the next millennium.  These
include, inter alia, the impact of (conflicting) values on the successes of mediation
in intra-state conflicts; equipping military personnel with specific skills to enable
them to optimally play a peacekeeping role; issuing a clear mandate to the peace-
keepers; as well as acknowledging the significant role of a civil society in the
effective implementation of post-conflict peace-building.15
At this juncture, it needs to be reiterated that value differences, for example, have
made ideological conflicts in general and ethnic conflicts in particular not to be
amenable to mediation.16 The three cases above have, in varying degrees, shown
this.  On the one hand, ethnic conflicts in Rwanda (and Burundi) have been
simmering for a considerable period of time and up to now, a lasting solution to
them is not yet in sight.17 On the other, ideological conflicts (like the one in Angola)
invariably reduce the successes of mediation to a bare minimum.
3. RE-EVALUATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA: 
SOUTH AFRICA S PERCEPTIONS?
These afore-mentioned tragic events highlighted a dire need for the OAU to be
proactive in resolving African conflicts.  In 1994, following the adoption of
MCPMR in Egypt in 1993, this idea was gradually beginning to crystallise into
something more concrete.  Since the adoption of the MCPMR, the OAU has helped
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manner of intervention here was reinforced by the need on the part of South Africa
to transform herself from a pariah state in Southern Africa.  As a result South Africa
places a high premium on multilateral response.  For this reason, South Africa
perceives the SADC as an institutional framework for this.
In addition to quiet diplomacy, South Africa s foreign policy establishment appears
to have been overwhelmed by President Mandela s personalising of South Africa s
foreign relations (Onadipe 1996:1672-1673).  This factor, as was evidenced in
November 1995, has a direct bearing on the manner in which South Africa inter-
venes in conflict situations in Africa.  South Africa s disastrous Nigeria policy
vindicates this claim.
Perhaps, a brief historical background to the situation in Nigeria will make this point
more clear.  South Africa s involvement in Nigeria started long before the execution
of the Ogoni Nine.  President Mandela devoted a lot of his time in diffusing the
crisis in Nigeria, following Gen Babangida s annulment of the 1993 elections.  The
annulment precipitated widespread civil unrest, leading to the dismissal of
Babangida and the ascension of a new military regime under Sani Abacha, follow-
ing the demise of a civilian government which Babangida hastily installed as he
made his quick exit.  The new military regime detained Chief Moshood Abiola,
widely believed to have won the 1993 elections.  This arrest took place after Chief
Abiola declared himself as the president of Nigeria in June 1994.
South Africa initially responded when President Mandela dispatched Archbishop
Desmond Tutu to Nigeria.  Tutu s mission was to initiate a dialogue with the Abacha
regime and to negotiate for the release of Chief Abiola.  Abacha and his rogues were
intransigent and Tutu s mission failed.  This became abundantly clear when a
tribunal tried, and subsequently sentenced to death, the former head of state, Gen
Obasanjo, and thirty-nine others for plotting a coup.  This act evoked further pleas
for clemency.
This time, President Mandela sent the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who had a
cordial relationship with that country when he acted as the ANC s representative in
Lagos during the 1970s.  This mission was not successful either:  It was followed by
the trial of the Ogoni Nine.  This time around, the military tribunal sentenced 
Ken Saro Wiwa, an internationally acclaimed writer and an environmental activist,
together with his eight compatriots to death amid clarion calls for clemency.
At this point, President Mandela intervened personally.  He telephonically contacted
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Pretoria s dilemma
Since her liberation in April 1994, South Africa has had to transform herself from a
pariah state into an equal partner (in Southern Africa).  This then wrought enormous
changes in South Africa s foreign policy.  Noticeable here is the cornerstone of
South Africa s foreign policy: the protection and promotion of human rights and
democracy.  South Africa, as result, is more vocal on issues like banning the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons as well as the use of limpet mines.  Environmental issues
also seem to be topping the shopping list of South Africa s foreign policy.
In the light of these changes, a democratic South Africa adopted an ambivalent policy
towards the region and indeed the rest of the continent (Hanekom 1997:7).  This was
clearly reflected in the manner in which South Africa intervened in subsequent
conflicts right across Africa.  South Africa s circumspect intervention, as dictated to
by her evolving foreign policy, evoked mixed reactions not only within the country,
but on the continent as a whole.  Chris Landsberg corroborated this view.  He said:
Some critics of the ANC government have been catching on to what they
believe is South Africa s retreat from peacemaking on the African continent.
Others will go as far as to complain that Pretoria s general involvement in
Africa s affairs is not as nearly as pronounced as many in the continent
would wish or had expected, following the demise of apartheid.
(Landsberg 1996:1670)
As will be shown hereunder, there is an overwhelming evidence on how South
Africa s evolving foreign policy subjected her to a great strain with regard to her
conflict resolution endeavours in Africa.  Perhaps one tenet of South Africa s
foreign policy is to stress diplomacy rather than military intervention.  The archi-
tects of South Africa s evolving foreign policy seem to be having a strong belief in
the maxim that diplomacy makes a greater contribution in African conflict resolu-
tion than more ambitious but sometimes less successful alternatives — as was
revealed elsewhere in Africa (Landsberg 1996:1670).
This was evidenced by South s Africa use of quiet diplomacy when there was a
royal coup in Lesotho in 1994.  South Africa wasted no time in uniting with other
erstwhile Frontline States, particularly Botswana and Zimbabwe, calling for the
immediate reversal of the coup.  Through diplomacy, South Africa, together with her
partners in the region, managed to contain a potentially explosive situation as the
democratically elected government of Ntsu Mokhetle was reinstated.  South Africa s
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Perhaps the 1997 conflict in Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of
Congo) highlighted the dilemma of South Africa s foreign policy: if South Africa
establishes herself as a centrifugal force in Southern Africa, she would be accused of
harbouring hegemonic aspirations; if she adopted a moderate, isolationist approach,
she would be criticised for callousness.
Given this dilemma, the Nigerian fiasco and moderate success in Angola, South
Africa s role as peacemaker in Zaire indicated that South Africa s search for a
foreign policy victory still goes on.  However, the Zairean endeavour did not pay off
either.  Evidence to prove this is overwhelming.
South Africa s diplomatic shuffle in Zaire started in March, 1997, when South
Africa hosted Zairean envoy Honore Ngbanda and opposition leader Laurent
Kabila.  In these secret preliminary talks four items were discussed: the status of the
talks and the weight of the resolutions taken; a cease-fire between warring factions
in Zaire; the combination of a South African-led initiative with the OAU and UN
peace efforts; and the role of external forces in finding a solution (Hartley
1997a:27).  The subsequent talks arranged by South Africa could not reconcile the
warring factions.  In the end, a military solution prevailed.
A chronology of the events in Zaire clearly indicated that South Africa s interven-
tion did not differ markedly from the previous cases.  For one thing, there were still
vestiges of the personalisation of the foreign policy establishment by President
Nelson Mandela.  For example, in his attempt to maintain sound personal relations
with (the late) Mobutu Sese Seko, President Mandela, in a manner reminiscent of
Nigeria, has on more than one occasion preferred to rely on direct telephone conver-
sation with him (Mobutu).  One such incident took place after the preliminary talks
in April (Hartley 1997b:4).
Also, as was the case in Rwanda, South Africa remained reluctant to commit her
troops in a peacekeeping initiative.  For example, the deputy minister of Foreign
Affairs, Aziz Pahad, was quoted in April 1997 as having said that South Africa
remained committed to involvement in an international peacekeeping initiative.
However, that commitment went down with the caveat that such initiative would not
necessarily involve troops (Hartley 1997b:4).  This statement affirmed South
Africa s foreign policy tenet that unless proximity dictates otherwise, South Africa
will commit her troops in peacekeeping operations only under the aegis of the UN
and OAU.
117
the highest authorities of the Abacha government in Abuja.  This phenomenon
continued until President Mandela s departure for the Commonwealth summit in
New Zealand.  Throughout, President Mandela remained optimistic and this
prompted him to adopt a more soft approach towards the egregious Abacha regime.
This, however, turned out to be his Achilles heel: the Ogoni Nine were hanged
amidst all those calls for clemency.  This clearly indicated that, contrary to majority
expectations, South Africa s mission in Nigeria had, in fact, failed.  All the frantic
attempts that South Africa made afterwards could not salvage the situation.19
Furthermore, South Africa s evolving foreign policy seems to indicate that South
Africa prefers to engage in high-risk peacekeeping operations only under the
auspices of the UN and the OAU.  For this specific reason, a democratic South
Africa has been careful not to become involved in peacekeeping efforts beyond her
immediate region.  Thus the South African Government refused to send peace-
keeping forces to Rwanda in 1994.  On the contrary, South Africa only offered
humanitarian aid to Rwanda, and logistical support to Mozambique during the
November 1994 elections.
The Rwandan civil war could have presented to South Africa a golden opportunity
to prove her peacekeeping capabilities.  However, South Africa let it slip away.
Why?  One (and perhaps the only plausible) explanation is that South Africa has no
experience in international peacekeeping.  In the situations in Angola, Mozambique,
Rwanda and Burundi, South Africa did not play this role; other players — the UN,
France and Belgium — did.  Even in Southern Africa, other countries like Zimbabwe
and Zambia seem to be better off in this regard, compared to South Africa (See
Kapoma 1996:1-4).
Another tenet of South Africa s foreign policy is neutrality.  According to South
Africa s version of conflict resolution, this tenet entails talking to all parties in the
conflict.  This is in line with a democratic South Africa s bottom line: respect of
human rights and provision of humanitarian assistance and logistical support to
complement international peacekeeping efforts.  South Africa s belief in neutrality
became clear, when South Africa, in an attempt to diffuse the situation in Angola,
held talks with UNITA20 in Umtata (Daily Dispatch 1997:2).  So far, South Africa s
attempts have only been moderate as there are allegations that UNITA is once again
mobilising its forces (See Gordon 1997:24; Gordon 1998:4; Gordon & Barrell
1998:4).  Similarly, in Sudan South Africa has so far managed to talk to the leaders
of the major stake-holders in the Sudanese conflict.21
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the highest authorities of the Abacha government in Abuja.  This phenomenon
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A sublime feature of South Africa s involvement in Zaire was the working in tandem
with the US.  When the crisis in Zaire was rife, the vice president, Thabo Mbeki,
was said to have been in close contact with his US counterpart Al Gore.22 However,
even this strategy does not seem to have salvaged South Africa from her foreign
policy dilemma (See Mamdani 1997:10).
4. CONCLUSION
A lasting solution to Africa s conflicts now, it seems, has to come from within Africa
herself.  This was clearly indicated by ECOMOG in Liberia.  Although ECOMOG
was not a resounding success, many Liberians today are still indebted to it.  Was it
not for ECOMOG s intervention, many of them would not be alive today.
However, because conflict resolution and peacekeeping is a costly exercise,
continued support from the UN, US and other Western, particularly the Nordic,
countries will be necessary to facilitate African initiatives.  The international
community can, for example, adequately provide the much needed financial and
logistical support and expertise.
Perhaps the events in Somalia and Rwanda have taught us a lesson in this regard:
peacekeeping or conflict resolution should not be a monopoly of the military, but
should involve many facets of society, including politicians, civil society, and
humanitarian organisations.  In addition, African conflict resolution needs to involve
regional and sub-regional organisations and powers.
The fact that this harsh reality is beginning to dawn on the minds of major donor
countries and agencies, bodes well for African conflict resolution in the next 
millennium.  The UN, for example, has come up with a special initiative on 
Africa.  In addition, the fact that the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan,
comes from Africa, augurs well for African future initiatives (See, for example,
Annan 1997:31-33).  Furthermore, the US, through the 1994 African Conflict
Resolution Act of 1994, has authorised $1,5 billion between 1995 and 1998.  In line
with this, the US is further proposing the setting up of a 10 000 strong Africa Crisis 
Reaction Force.
Despite all this, the ultimate responsibility is still on African regional organisations
and powers.  As shown above, the OAU has already made some remarkable
improvements in this regard and these will not be reiterated here.  Rather, a thorny
question, which the remainder of this paper will attempt to respond to, is: Where
does South Africa stand on this issue?
Lest the impression created so far be that South Africa cannot legitimately pursue
her foreign policy goals if she does so at the expense of African conflict resolution
initiatives, let me quickly point out that this is obviously not the case.  South Africa,
like any other state actors in the international system, needs to vigorously pursue her
foreign policy goals here and abroad.  There is, for example, nothing sinister with
South Africa vying for the much coveted position of a permanent African represen-
tative in the UN Security Council.  Rather, what is the real issue here is that there are
conspicuous discrepancies between her foreign policy goals and the manner in
which they are pursued.  As the shopping list of her foreign policy indicates, South
Africa is particularly concerned with attracting foreign investment and establishing
more trading partners.  Next to these are the promotion of human rights and the
prevention of environmental degradation.  Africa seems to be at the bottom of the
shopping list of South Africa s foreign policy.  The ad hoc bases on which South
Africa attends to the problems that keep on nagging this continent leave one really
wondering as to whether South Africa does have a policy towards Africa at all (See
Hanekom 1997:7; Barrell 1998:6).  The haphazard manner in which South Africa
has responded to the renewed conflicts in Lesotho23 and in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC)24 has once again brought this critical question to the fore.
What are the implications of this state of affairs on African conflict resolution and
South Africa s perceptions thereof?  As pointed out earlier on, South Africa has not
been in a position, for example, to successfully reconcile economic objectives, on
the one hand, and the protection of fundamental human rights as well the promotion
of democracy on the other.  There are a number of cases that attest to this assertion.
The Nigerian debacle is one example.  The other case — outside Africa — is that of
Indonesia.  Noticeable here is the fact that because of ambitions to strengthen 
trade links with Indonesia, South Africa (much to the dislike of East Timor) failed 
to adopt a tough stance against that country s gross violation of human rights in 
East Timor.
What South Africa can (and should) do is to vigorously pursue her foreign policy,
particularly when the values avowedly stated in her foreign policy dictate so.  In
addition, South Africa needs to come up with a holistic approach vis- -vis ad hoc
bases when dealing with this continent.  Failure to do so can result in South Africa
not only ignominiously forfeiting her foreign policy goals, but also failing to meet
(reasonably) heightened expectations in the rest of the continent.
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Unfortunately, South Africa seems to be brushing this fact aside.  South Africa s
policy (like any other policy) remains strongly moulded by her daunting domestic
challenges.25 Therefore, South Africa s prevalent view that she is not yet ready to
lead the formation of the Africa Crisis Reaction Force as suggested by the US, I
believe, does not come as a surprise.  But, the same view is particularly disquieting
and disconcerting to the critics of South Africa, given the fact that the Africa Crisis
Reaction Force would have presented her with a golden opportunity to reconnect
with the rest of the continent.
It is perhaps due to these domestic challenges that South Africa has given the US
idea of spearheading the formation of an African Crisis Reaction Force a wide
berth.26 For South Africa, anything beyond the level of involvement that she has
displayed so far, will have to involve the UN and the US — financially or otherwise.
This perception, which undoubtedly will have a direct impact on the prospects for
African conflict resolution, is likely to last well into the next millennium.
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NOTES
1 Mr Gwexe is a lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Transkei,
Umtata, South Africa.
2 For a detailed analysis of South Africa s evolving Foreign Policy, see, inter alia, Van Aardt
1996:107-119; Breytenbach 1997:274-277.
3 Unless stated otherwise, in this paper the term conflict will be used to refer to ethnic, religious,
regional and other forms of conflict (Regan 1996:338), and the term conflict resolution will be
broadly used  to refer to preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making, as well as post-
conflict peace-building (Boutros-Ghali 1992:11-12).
4 See, amongst others, West Africa, No. 3911 (31 August-6 September, 1992):1470-1473; 
No. 3918 (19-25 October, 1992):1764-1766; No. 3936 (1-7 March, 1993):325-327; No. 3937
(8-14 March, 1993):369; No. 3957 (26 July-1 August, 1993):1292-1296; No. 3943 (19-25
April, 1993):638; No. 3984 (7-13 February, 1994):206-210; No. 4012 (22-28 August,
1994):1462-1465; No. 4098 (6-12 May, 1996):697-700; No. 4113 (19-25 August, 1996):1306-
1311; No. 4124 (11-17 November, 1996):1750-1755.
5 West Africa, No. 3911 (31 August-6 September, 1992):1471.
6 Later on this number increased up to 10 000 and 12 000 troops.  Nigeria was a major contrib-
utor in this regard.  See Barrett 1993:638-640.
7 In this model, G represents an incumbent government, and R a rebel organisation.  If we
need to expound on this model, we can possibly think of the prevailing conflict situation in
Angola and assert that G stands for the MPLA government, and R for the UNITA rebel
movement.  For detailed information on this model, see Mason & Fett 1996:546-550.
8 West Africa, No. 3911 (31 August-6 September, 1992):1471.
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23 For more information on the post mortem of the recent Lesotho crisis, see, amongst others,
Daily Dispatch, 11 August 1998:1; Mail & Guardian, 31 July-6 August 1998:6, 26 August- 
3 September 1998:6; 18-24 September 1998:3; and Sunday Times, 27 September 1998:4.
24 Since the beginning of August, 1998, the renewed conflict in the DRC has put South Africa in a
quagmire.  For more information in this regard, see, amongst others, Daily Dispatch, 7 August
1998:10, 11 August 1998:3, 24 August 1998:1, 31 August 1998:1; Mail & Guardian, 28 August-
3 September 1998: 6-7; and Sunday Times, 30 August 1998:13.
25 South Africa s domestic challenges are well known and well documented elsewhere so that an
in-depth analysis is not necessary here.  For more information in this regard, see, amongst
others, Gwexe 1996:44-53; Daily Dispatch, 14 March 1997:16; Mail & Guardian, 14-19 March
1997:12; Indicator SA, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Winter) 1994:64, Vol. 12, No. 13 (Winter) 1995:33;
Africa Insight, Vol. 25, No. 4 1995:221; and New African, No. 326 (January) 1995:31.
26 For other possible reasons, see Cilliers & Malan 1996:339-346; Mail & Guardian, 29 August-
4 September 1997:12; and Sunday Times, 27 October 1996:15.
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